

## Ossifying Ossification: Why the Information Quality Act Should Not Provide for Judicial Review

by Margaret Clune

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*Editors' Summary: The Information Quality Act (IQA) was created to ensure the "quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity" of information disseminated by federal agencies. Although the Act's implementation guidelines allow for an administrative appeal process, the IQA does not provide for judicial review. Thus far, the courts have rejected claims for judicial review of agency IQA decisions. Those who support a broad reading of the Act, therefore, are likely to seek legislative relief. In this Article, Margaret Clune argues against allowing judicial review of IQA requests. In addition to demonstrating why neither the IQA nor the APA allow for judicial review, she implores Congress not to make the IQA judicially reviewable. Doing so would improperly delegate policy questions to the courts, exacerbate existing problems of the IQA, and overburden the federal courts.*

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### I. Introduction

The Information Quality Act (IQA or the Act) aims to ensure the "quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity" of information disseminated by federal agencies.<sup>1</sup> The Act required first the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and then the federal agencies to establish information quality guidelines. The Act further provides that members of the public may request that agencies correct information falling short of these guidelines through an administrative process. In its guidelines on implementing the Act, the OMB broadened the requirement to include an administrative appeal process, also to be conducted by the agencies that "disseminate" covered information. The IQA, however, does not provide for judicial review. Instead, the IQA, alternately known as the Data Quality Act, rests oversight of agency implementation with the OMB. Despite the congressional decision to leave the courts out of the IQA process, some intrepid industry petitioners have challenged agency decisions to reject IQA requests for correction in court.

So far, two U.S. district courts have rejected attempts to seek judicial review of agency IQA decisions.<sup>2</sup> In March

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1. Section 515 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-153-154 (2000) [hereinafter Information Quality Act].
2. *Salt Inst. v. Thompson*, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2004); *In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig.*, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Minn. 2004) (order granting summary judgment).

2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld one of those rulings in *Salt Institute v. Leavitt*,<sup>3</sup> finding that the IQA "does not create any legal right to information or its correctness."<sup>4</sup>

Although the Fourth Circuit's word in the *Salt Institute* case was the first by a federal appeals court on the issue of whether the IQA is judicially reviewable, it will not be the last. Jim Tozzi, former OMB official, original proponent of the IQA, and co-founder of the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, has indicated that his group is "exploring other litigation in other circuits" to further test the IQA's judicial reviewability.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, following the Fourth Circuit's decision, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce renewed its call for the U.S. Congress to make the IQA judicially reviewable.<sup>6</sup> All the attention being paid to the question is warranted, for as the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service has observed, "[t]he determination of whether agencies' actions

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3. 440 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2006).

4. *Id.* at 159.

5. *OMB Downplays Impact of Data Quality Act on Federal Agencies*, RISK POLICY REPORT (Dec. 22, 2005), at <http://www.insideepa.com>.

6. Manu Raju, *Ruling Sparks New Industry Bid for Court Review of Data Decisions*, INSIDE EPA (Mar. 10, 2006), at <http://www.insideepa.com>; see also *Improving Information Quality in the Federal Government: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform*, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of William L. Kovacs, Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce), available at <http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/7-20-2005%20Kovacs%20Testimony.pdf> (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Information Quality Act Hearing (statement of William L. Kovacs)]; see also *OMB Downplays Impact of Data Quality Act on Federal Agencies*, *supra* note 5 (reporting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has indicated it will seek legislation amending the IQA to allow judicial review should it lose its appeal of the *Salt Institute* case).

are subject to judicial review under the IQA will clearly have a major effect on its implementation.”<sup>7</sup>

Both of the federal district courts that have considered claims under the IQA have concluded that agency decisions made under the Act are not judicially reviewable because the Act does not subject the action underlying such a challenge—the dissemination of data by an agency—to court supervision. As the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) argued before the Fourth Circuit, decisions made pursuant to this law are not judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because: (1) an agency decision on a petition for correction is not “final” in the sense required for APA judicial review; and (2) decisions on such petitions are committed to agency discretion.

After examining more fully the reasons the IQA does not provide judicial review, this Article will highlight some of the major arguments against amending the Act to provide for judicial review. Chief among the concerns that Congress must carefully consider before making the IQA judicially reviewable is that asking the courts to consider challenges filed under the Act as currently written would amount to an improper delegation of policy determinations. Additionally, adding judicial review would exacerbate existing problems with the Act, including its tendency to slow (or “ossify”) the regulatory process and to tilt the procedural balance in favor of the wealthy and well-organized.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the demands of deciding data correction challenges will add significantly to the burden of the already overtaxed federal court system.

## II. Origin of the IQA

The IQA came into the world in late 2000 as a rider buried between two unrelated provisions in the 2001 appropriations bill.<sup>9</sup> There were no hearings on the two paragraphs that would comprise the IQA, and no one referred to the provisions during the debate on the larger 2001 appropriations bill in which they were embedded.<sup>10</sup> Only two paragraphs long, the IQA directed the OMB to promulgate “policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of

information . . . disseminated by Federal agencies.”<sup>11</sup> The IQA further mandated that agencies promulgate their own guidelines and establish procedures under which affected persons may “seek and obtain correction of information . . . that does not comply with the guidelines.”<sup>12</sup> According to those who support the IQA, it is a “simple law,”<sup>13</sup> which “on its face, merely requires agencies to adhere to principles that few would dispute.”<sup>14</sup>

Precisely because of the universal desirability of ensuring that federal agencies use, rely on, and disseminate high-quality information, mechanisms toward that end existed prior to the IQA’s enactment.<sup>15</sup> There is no credible evidence that such mechanisms are inadequate, nor is there anything other than anecdotal evidence that agency information was flawed and in need of correction.<sup>16</sup> Thus, as the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) has previously argued, when enacted, the IQA was a “solution in search of a problem.”<sup>17</sup> Since then, as interpreted by the OMB and used by petitioners, the purportedly modest “good government” law has created more problems than it has solved.

## III. Adverse Effects of Implementation

The CPR’s analysis of a sampling of data correction petitions, more fully set forth in its report, *Truth and Science Betrayed: The Case Against the Information Quality Act*,<sup>18</sup> found that industry petitioners routinely file complaints that seek relief well beyond mere “correction” of information. The complaints can be organized into the following categories:

11. Information Quality Act, *supra* note 1, §(a).
12. *Id.* §(b)(2)(A) & (B).
13. Mark A. Greenwood, *The Information Quality Act: How a Sunshine Statute Brought a Perfect Storm*, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Mar. 25, 2005, at B-1.
14. *Id.* at B-2.
15. The OMB’s IQA guidelines acknowledge that “in accordance with OMB Circular A-130, agencies already have in place well-established information quality standards and administrative mechanisms that allow persons to seek and obtain correction of information that is maintained and disseminated by the agency.” OMB, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8453 (Feb. 22, 2002) [hereinafter OMB Guidelines] (referencing OMB Circular A-130). Additionally, for example, EPA’s eight-step Agency-wide quality system “helps ensure that EPA organizations maximize the quality of environmental information, including information disseminated by the Agency.” U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING AND MAXIMIZING THE QUALITY, OBJECTIVITY, UTILITY, AND INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 10-11 (EPA/260R-02-008) (2002), available at [http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/EPA\\_InfoQualityGuidelines.pdf](http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/EPA_InfoQualityGuidelines.pdf) (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) (also available from the ELR Guidance & Policy Collection, ELR Order No. AD04993).
16. According to Prof. Wendy Wagner of the University of Texas School of Law, “despite the thousands of public health and safety regulations promulgated annually, there are surprisingly few examples of EPA using unreliable science or using science inappropriately to support a final regulation.” Wendy E. Wagner, *The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation*, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72 (2003). Professor Wagner’s analysis reveals that any “bad science” problem that does exist involves information produced by regulated industry and not by the agencies themselves. *Id.* at 73.
17. For more detail regarding the arguments set forth in this section, see MCGARITY ET AL., *supra* note 10.
18. *Id.*

7. CURTIS W. COPELAND & MICHAEL SIMPSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT: OMB’S GUIDANCE AND INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION 17 (2004), available at [http://www.ombwatch.org/info/dataquality/RL32532\\_CRS\\_DQA.pdf](http://www.ombwatch.org/info/dataquality/RL32532_CRS_DQA.pdf) (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

8. The term “ossification” was coined by Prof. E. Donald Elliott, former General Counsel of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Thomas O. McGarity, *Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process*, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992) (citing E. Donald Elliott, Remarks at the Symposium on “Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty Years: Law, Politics, and Economics,” at Duke University School of Law (Nov. 15, 1990)). As Prof. Thomas McGarity explains, the term describes the phenomenon whereby “an assortment of analytical requirements have been imposed on the simple rulemaking model, and evolving judicial doctrines have obliged agencies to take greater pains to ensure that the technical bases for rules are capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.” *Id.*

9. Information Quality Act, *supra* note 1. The IQA paragraphs appear between provisions relating to a transfer of land to support the Gerald R. Ford Museum and Library and the nonforeign area cost-of-living allowance.

10. THOMAS O. MCGARITY ET AL., TRUTH AND SCIENCE BETRAYED: THE CASE AGAINST THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT 2 (CPR Publication No. 502) (2005), available at <http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/iqa.pdf> (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).

ries, all of which share the common characteristic of seeking to frustrate regulatory action:

- *Delay*. Petitioners file IQA complaints in an attempt to challenge long overdue regulatory actions that have already been the subject of numerous public participation opportunities.
- *Censorship*. Though the remedy offered by the IQA is correction of information, numerous petitioners have chosen to ignore that fact and instead have sought complete withdrawal or exclusion of inconvenient information.
- *“Correcting” Policy, Not Information*. Under the guise of seeking correction of information, numerous petitioners have instead challenged policy decisions that agencies are authorized to make—particularly those that take a precautionary approach to uncertainty.
- *End Run Around Health and Safety Laws*. In the course of challenging management and policy decisions rather than seeking the correction of information errors, petitioners have sought to bypass existing statutory procedures with respect to health, safety, and the environment.
- *Frustrating Agency Efforts to Cope With Uncertainty*. Incomplete information is not the same as poor quality information, but industry petitioners frequently challenge the policy decisions made by agencies when they lack definitive or complete information. In effect, these petitioners claim that the IQA provides industry with an opportunity to impose substantive standards that they would be unable to argue for directly.
- *Fishing Expeditions*. Arguing their need for underlying data to assess the “reproducibility” of agency analyses, petitioners have inappropriately sought records under the IQA rather than the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).<sup>19</sup>
- *Sidestepping the Courts*. Attempting to employ the IQA as an administrative opportunity to file motions in limine, industry petitioners have sought agency withdrawal of information that they either have been unable to exclude from evidence in court or would prefer not to encounter in later litigation.

Although agencies have so far resisted such inappropriate attempts to expansively invoke the IQA, they must devote untold time and resources responding to IQA petitions for correction, the majority of which are ultimately dismissed as lacking merit.<sup>20</sup> The OMB imposed its IQA guidelines without any analysis concerning the costs and benefits of implementing them. Accordingly, it is impossible to know what programs, initiatives, and actions are being delayed or altogether pushed aside by agencies already strapped for resources sufficient to implement their statutory mandates.

#### IV. Judicial Review

##### A. The Act Itself Does Not Provide for Judicial Review

As explained by the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in the *Salt Institute* case, “[f]or a plaintiff to

enforce the provisions of a federal law in court, Congress must first have afforded the party a private right of action.”<sup>21</sup> As the Fourth Circuit recently confirmed in upholding the *Salt Institute* decision, the IQA provides for no such right.<sup>22</sup> Rather, the IQA directs the OMB to provide guidance to federal agencies and federal agencies, in turn, are to establish their own information quality guidelines.<sup>23</sup> It addresses the interests of “affected persons” by requiring that agencies provide them the opportunity to “seek and obtain correction of information” through “administrative mechanisms” established by the agencies.<sup>24</sup> Thus, “[t]he language of the IQA reflects Congress’ intent that any challenges to the quality of information disseminated by federal agencies should take place in administrative proceedings before federal agencies and not in the courts.”<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the IQA’s “very limited legislative history” fails to provide “a mechanism for judicial review of information quality or any avenue for judicial relief.”<sup>26</sup>

##### B. The APA Does Not Permit Judicial Review of the IQA

The alternate avenue for judicial relief that would-be IQA plaintiffs have attempted to invoke is the APA. The APA allows persons to obtain judicial review of agency actions that are both “final” and “not committed to agency discretion by law.”<sup>27</sup> Agency actions under the IQA, however, fail both prerequisites for APA review: they are not final, and they are committed to agency discretion by law.

21. *Salt Inst. v. Thompson*, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 601 (E.D. Va. 2004).

22. *Salt Inst. v. Leavitt*, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2006). The court found that because the IQA “does not create any legal right to information or its correctness,” appellants in the case “failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III.” The court’s analysis focused on Article III standing, a constitutional prerequisite for parties to pursue their claims in court. The Fourth Circuit did not analyze whether appellants’ alleged injury was sufficiently concrete or specific, nor did it address the related inquiries concerning traceability and redressability of the claimed injury. Rather, the court explained that it need not decide whether the alleged injury met these other requirements because whether or not Congress had granted a legal right to information or its correctness was an “antecedent question.” *Id.* Other aspects of constitutional standing analysis, including, in particular, the traceability of the injury alleged in a would-be IQA plaintiff’s pleadings may, in specific cases, provide an additional argument against judicial review of agency decisions under the Act. *See, e.g., infra* note 38 and accompanying text. This analysis leaves aside such arguments, which are properly considered on the facts of each particular case. Instead, this Article focuses on generally applicable principles concerning the reasons that agency information dissemination fails the APA’s prerequisites for judicial review.

23. Information Quality Act, *supra* note 1, §§(a) & (b)(2)(A).

24. *Id.* §(b)(2)(B).

25. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 601; *accord* In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1174-75 (D. Minn. 2004) (order granting summary judgment).

26. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 593; *see also supra* note 9 and accompanying text.

27. 5 U.S.C. §704 (providing that “final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review”) (emphasis added); *id.* §701(a)(2) (excluding “agency action committed to agency discretion by law” from judicial review provisions of the APA). *See also Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02 (citing, *inter alia*, *Transactive Corp. v. United States*, 91 F.3d 232, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (indicating presumption of APA judicial review does not apply if agency action is committed to agency discretion by law or if action is not final)).

19. 5 U.S.C. §§552-552a.

20. MCGARITY ET AL., *supra* note 10, at 11-12.

## 1. Data Dissemination Is Not Final Agency Action

The agency action that the IQA addresses is dissemination of information.<sup>28</sup> Courts have long held that information dissemination does not constitute final agency action. This conclusion derives from the U.S. Supreme Court's requirements that to be final, agency action must: (1) mark the "consummation" of the agency's decision-making process; and (2) be one from which legal consequences flow, or by which rights or obligations are determined.<sup>29</sup> Thus, even where a report or other agency information marks the consummation of the agency's decision-making process, in order to be considered final action subject to APA review, it must give rise to legal consequences, rights, or obligations.<sup>30</sup>

The *Salt Institute* case provides an example of the reasons that reports and information of the kind likely to be challenged under the IQA fail the "legal consequences, rights or obligations" test. Appellants/plaintiffs in that case, the Salt Institute and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (collectively, the "Salt Plaintiffs") are, respectively, a trade association made up of companies that produce and market salt and a business federation that includes companies that market foods containing salt.<sup>31</sup> They objected to the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute's (NHLBI's) reporting, on its website, the results of the Dietary Approaches to Stop Hypertension-Sodium Trial (DASH-Sodium Trial), which recommended limits on dietary sodium intake.<sup>32</sup>

Unhappy with the NHLBI's publication of the DASH-Sodium Trial results, the Salt Plaintiffs filed an IQA complaint that did not request "correction" of any specific information, but instead sought the disclosure of the data underlying the study.<sup>33</sup> The NHLBI, part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), denied the petition, correctly noting that the appropriate avenue through which to seek access to data is FOIA, not the IQA.<sup>34</sup> The NHLBI also noted, among other things, that the challenged information satisfied the NIH's informa-

tion quality standards.<sup>35</sup> The Salt Plaintiffs next submitted an administrative "Request for Reconsideration" with the NHLBI,<sup>36</sup> which the NHLBI denied.<sup>37</sup> The Salt Plaintiffs then filed suit and claimed generally that they had "suffered actual or threatened injury" due to the NHLBI's conduct.<sup>38</sup>

Though the plaintiffs did not specify their alleged injuries, the district court surmised that the "Plaintiffs might contend that they are injured by NHLBI's dissemination of the results of the DASH-Sodium Trial because this information might cause consumers to reduce their consumption of salt, thus decreasing the Plaintiffs' constituent members' sales."<sup>39</sup> The original IQA petition recited impacts similar to those articulated by the court. According to the petition, the companies that make up the Salt Institute "are, on a bottom line basis, directly affected by changes in the public's use of salt and salted products," which "in turn, is heavily influenced by scientific findings of the federal government."<sup>40</sup>

The potential consequences of the DASH-Sodium Trial complained of by the Salt Plaintiffs typify the broad category of consequences that proponents of the IQA hope it will minimize. According to Mark Greenwood of the Coalition for Effective Environmental Information, "[i]n the modern world, [the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] uses a wide array of non-regulatory tools to influence behavior."<sup>41</sup> According to Greenwood, guidance documents, scientific assessments, and environmental data, now increasingly available via the Internet, "can have impacts profound as any legal mandate."<sup>42</sup> Companies that stand to suffer from such information disclosure claim the "public can easily misinterpret complex data"<sup>43</sup>; the Center for Reg-

28. Information Quality Act, *supra* note 1, §(a) (directing the OMB to provide guidance to federal agencies "for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information . . . disseminated by Federal agencies . . .").

29. *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 27 ELR 20824 (1997) (citing *Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.*, 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948); *Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic*, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).

30. *See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA*, 313 F.3d 852, 33 ELR 20113 (4th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that where parties agreed the report in question marked consummation of the Agency's decisionmaking process, the critical issue was whether the report gave rise to legal consequences, rights, or obligations).

31. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (citing First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 7, 8).

32. *Id.*

33. Letter from William L. Kovacs, Vice President, Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce & Richard L. Hanneman, President, Salt Institute, to Office of Communications, NHLBI, National Institutes of Health (NIH) (May 14, 2003), available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/infoquality/request&response/8a.pdf> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter *Salt IQA Petition*]; *see also Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 596.

34. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 596; *see also* Letter from Carl A. Roth, Ph.D., LL.M., Associate Director for Scientific Program Operation, NHLBI, NIH, to William L. Kovacs, Vice President, Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce & Richard L. Hanneman, President, Salt Institute (Aug. 19, 2003), available at [http://aspe.hhs.gov/infoquality/request&response/reply\\_8b.shtml](http://aspe.hhs.gov/infoquality/request&response/reply_8b.shtml) (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter *NHLBI Response to Salt IQA Petition*].

35. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 596; *see also* NHLBI Response to Salt IQA Petition, *supra* note 34.

36. Letter from William L. Kovacs, Vice President, Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce & Richard L. Hanneman, President, Salt Institute, to Associate Director for Communications, Office of the Director, NIH (Sept. 22, 2003), available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/infoquality/request&response/8c.pdf> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

37. Letter from Barbara Alving, M.D., Acting Director, NHLBI, NIH, to William L. Kovacs, Vice President, Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce & Richard L. Hanneman, President, Salt Institute (Feb. 11, 2004), available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/infoquality/request&response/8d.shtml> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

38. Plaintiffs' failure to make specific assertions of injury caused by the NHLBI's conduct led the court to conclude that plaintiffs had not suffered harm of the type sufficiently concrete and particularized to confer standing to sue. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 599.

39. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 599.

40. *Salt IQA Petition*, *supra* note 33, at 14. In their opening brief before the Fourth Circuit, appellants, the Salt Institute and the Chamber of Commerce, rebuke the district court for "wander[ing] in a thicket of non-germane inquiries, investigating presumed economic affects [*sic*], speculating on the hypothetical behavior of the public and perusing the general literature on sodium consumption and blood pressure . . ." Brief of Appellants at 23, *Salt Inst. v. Leavitt*, No. 05-1097 (4th Cir. 2005), available at <http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/briefsrtoz.htm> (follow "Salt Institute and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Leavitt" link) (last visited Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter *Salt Brief*]. According to appellants, their standing to pursue their case in court (apparently, as distinct from their rationale for being "affected persons" under the IQA) derives from their "informational rights conferred . . . by Congress in the IQA." *Id.*

41. Greenwood, *supra* note 13, at B-4.

42. *Id.*

43. *Id.*

ulatory Effectiveness has dubbed the phenomenon “Regulation by Information.”<sup>44</sup>

Information disseminated by federal agencies, particularly consumer-oriented agencies, may well influence the public and other decisionmakers just as Congress intended.<sup>45</sup> Even if information has this impact, however, the impact, as the courts recognize, is “indirect and arises from the reactions and choices of . . . customers.”<sup>46</sup> Since the consequences of information disclosure are associated with the “independent responses and choices of third parties,” they do not legally flow from the agency’s dissemination of the information and do not constitute final agency action.<sup>47</sup>

Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit warned in the context of EPA’s issuance of a 1993 report that classified second-hand smoke as a known human carcinogen:

[A]s a practical matter and of considerable importance, if we were to adopt the position that agency actions producing only pressures on third parties were reviewable under the APA, then almost any agency policy or publication issued by the government would be subject to judicial review. We do not think that Congress intended to create private rights of actions to challenge the inevitable objectionable impressions created whenever controversial research by a federal agency is published. Such policy statements are properly challenged through the political process and not the courts.<sup>48</sup>

## 2. Agency Action on an IQA Petition Is Not Final Agency Action

With the IQA, entities concerned about the impacts of information disclosure gained a formal tool with which they could administratively challenge faulty information. The newfound ability to formally seek “information correction” throughout the federal agencies, however, failed to satisfy entities seeking to muffle information disclosure. Without judicial review, the argument goes, “agency personnel will not take the IQA seriously,” if only because of competing demands on their time.<sup>49</sup>

Seeking to evade the established principle that agency information dissemination is not “final agency action” within the meaning of the APA, the Salt Plaintiffs argued that the passage of the IQA “radically altered the prerequisites for APA review.”<sup>50</sup> They complained that when the NHLBI denied their administrative appeal, they were left with no place

to go.<sup>51</sup> Thus, they implored, it is “difficult to understand how this could be described as anything other than the ‘consummation’ of the administrative decision making process.”<sup>52</sup> They maintained that the district court “misse[d] the point”<sup>53</sup> when it held that the NHLBI’s dissemination of the DASH-Sodium Trial results did not constitute final agency action.<sup>54</sup> According to the Salt Plaintiffs, “the agency’s denial of an IQA application is itself a legally germane ‘consequence,’”<sup>55</sup> because it deprived them of “their rights to seek and obtain correction of information.”<sup>56</sup>

It is the Salt Plaintiffs, not the district court, that missed the point. Their analysis collapsed into one the two necessary and distinct elements of finality. The gravamen of their argument was that: (1) when an agency denies an IQA request, its consideration of the request is complete; and (2) the “legal consequence” of the denial claimed by the Salt Plaintiffs is that the agency will not further consider the complaint (leaving them “nowhere to go”). The “consequence” alleged by the Salt Plaintiffs is but a different way of saying that the denial marks the “‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process.”

Concededly, the IQA aids plaintiffs in establishing the first required element of “finality” by clearly demarcating the “consummation” of agency decisionmaking processes on requests for information correction. It does not, however, change the legal consequences of information dissemination. As stated succinctly by the DOJ, “[t]he IQA does not transform an Agency’s otherwise unreviewable statements into final agency action reviewable under the APA.”<sup>57</sup>

44. See Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, *Regulation by Information*, at <http://www.thecre.com/information/index.html> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). For a detailed discussion of the role of Jim Tozzi, the founder of the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, in developing the Information Quality Act, see McGARITY ET AL., *supra* note 10, at 2-6.

45. Industrial Safety Equip. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118, 18 ELR 20598 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing, inter alia, Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. §§669(a), (d), 671; Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§241(a), 4321, 4364, 4366; Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §375).

46. *Id.* at 1121.

47. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 861, 33 ELR 20113 (4th Cir. 2002); see also *Industrial Safety Equip. Ass’n*, 837 F.2d at 1121.

48. *Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop.*, 313 F.3d at 861.

49. Greenwood, *supra* note 13, at B-4.

50. Brief of Appellee at 34, Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, No. 05-1097 (4th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter DOJ Brief].

51. Salt Brief, *supra* note 40, at 33.

52. *Id.*

53. *Id.*

54. Salt Inst. v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 602 (E.D. Va. 2004).

55. Salt Brief, *supra* note 40, at 33. The Salt Plaintiffs’ full statement reads: “[t]he agency’s denial of an IQA application is itself a legally germane consequence, just as is an agency’s denial of a request for disclosure of information under FOIA.” *Id.* Plaintiffs’ attempted analogy to denials of FOIA requests fails. FOIA specifically provides for judicial review of agency denials of requests for information, empowering district courts to “enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld . . .” 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(B). Thus, suits against agencies for denial of FOIA requests proceed under the APA’s provision that “agency action made reviewable by statute” is subject to judicial review, rather than its alternate authorization of judicial review of “final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court.” See 5 U.S.C. §704. Courts analyze what constitutes “final agency action,” including the legal consequences (or lack thereof) of agency information dissemination, pursuant to the provision authorizing judicial review of “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” See, e.g., *Industrial Safety Equip. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA*, 837 F.2d 1115, 1117, 18 ELR 20598 (D.C. Cir. 1988). As the Salt Plaintiffs plainly concede, since the IQA does not provide for judicial review, would-be IQA plaintiffs must attempt to convince courts that a denial of an IQA petition is “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” Salt Brief, *supra* note 40 at 31 (emphasis added).

56. Salt Brief, *supra* note 40, at 33. Although the Fourth Circuit’s disposal of the *Salt Institute* appeal on standing grounds rendered unnecessary any analysis of APA finality, the court explicitly rejected the argument that the IQA gave appellants the rights they complained were deprived. Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the IQA “does not create any legal right to information or its correctness.”).

57. DOJ Brief, *supra* note 50, at 34. The DOJ makes the related, but more technical, argument that the Salt Plaintiffs confuse the two requirements of exhaustion and finality, and that the exhaustion of administrative remedies does not make otherwise non-final agency action final. *Id.* at 37-38.

### 3. Decisions on IQA Petitions Are Committed to Agency Discretion

As noted above, the APA authorizes judicial review of agency actions only where the action in question is both “final” and “not committed to agency discretion by law.”<sup>58</sup> Not only are decisions on IQA petitions not “final” in the sense required for APA judicial review, but they are also firmly committed to the discretion of the reviewing agencies and thus precluded from review. Agency action is committed to the discretion of the agency by law when the authorizing statute is “‘drawn in such broad terms’ that ‘there is no law to apply.’”<sup>59</sup> Stated differently, without a “‘meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,’ . . . meaningful judicial review is impossible.”<sup>60</sup>

As the two federal district courts that have considered the issue thus far have concluded, the IQA fails to provide standards sufficient to evaluate whether an agency properly exercised its discretion in acting on an IQA petition.<sup>61</sup> The IQA’s goal statement, “ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information disseminated by the agency,” is a collection of terms not defined elsewhere in the statute. “Moreover, the history of the legislation fails to provide any indication as to the scope of these terms.”<sup>62</sup> As noted earlier, there were no hearings on the Act and no debate in the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate. Nor were there committee reports since the IQA came to life as an appropriations rider.

Proponents of the IQA argue that the OMB’s IQA guidelines “explain at great length and implement what is meant by each statutory quality test mandated.”<sup>63</sup> Importing the OMB’s interpretation of the statutory terms to guide judicial review of the IQA, however, “would ignore that Congress failed entirely to define these terms, which is a strong signal that it did not contemplate that [the] IQA would create a private right of action.”<sup>64</sup>

The language that Congress did elect to include indicates an affirmative intent that oversight of agency IQA implementation rests with the OMB, not the courts. The Act re-

quires agencies to “report periodically to the Director” of the OMB: (1) the nature and number of information quality complaints received; and (2) how those complaints were handled by the agency.<sup>65</sup> “In light of Congress’s failure to define key terms, this delegation indicates that Congress expected that [the] OMB would define the terms and enforce compliance with its definitions.”<sup>66</sup>

### V. Congress Should Not Make the IQA Judicially Reviewable

Testifying before Congress in July 2005, an official representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce responded to the possibility that the appeal of the *Salt Institute* litigation would result in affirmation that there can be no judicial review of the IQA. Congress, he suggested, “will then either have to provide for judicial review, or accept the contention that federal agencies have sole discretion over the quality of information disseminated to the public and to Congress.”<sup>67</sup> Indeed, now that the Fourth Circuit has confirmed that the IQA creates no legal right to information or its correctness, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is urging Congress to establish judicial review through legislation.<sup>68</sup>

The Chamber suggests that Congress’ chief concern under such circumstances should be whether to accept unfettered agency discretion over information quality. As an initial matter, this rhetoric ignores existing checks on agency information quality, not the least of which is the scheme set up by the IQA for which oversight authority rests explicitly with the OMB. Moreover, Congress should not authorize judicial review of the IQA because, as discussed above, standing alone, the Act’s vague terms do not provide adequate standards for a reviewing court to apply in evaluating the propriety of agency action on an IQA petition. If Congress authorizes judicial review of the IQA under the theory that the OMB guidelines offer sufficient supplementary guidance, it will delegate to the courts questions of policy properly left to the legislative and executive branches. Additionally, authorizing judicial review of the IQA will exacerbate many of the previously identified problems with the Act itself, including contributing to the ossification of rulemaking. Finally, creating a private right-of-action under the IQA would further burden the already over-

58. 5 U.S.C. §704 (providing that “final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review”) (emphasis added); 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2) (excluding “agency action committed to agency discretion by law” from judicial review provisions of the APA). See also *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02 (citing, inter alia, *Transactive Corp. v. United States*, 91 F.3d 232, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (indicating presumption of APA judicial review does not apply if agency action is committed to agency discretion by law or if action is not final)).

59. *In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig.*, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1174 (D. Minn. 2004) (order granting summary judgment) (quoting *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 15 ELR 20335 (1985)) (finding agency actions under the IQA committed to agency discretion).

60. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (quoting *Steenholdt v. FAA*, 314 F.3d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2003); *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 15 ELR 20335 (1985)).

61. *Salt Inst.*, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 602; see also *In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig.*, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75.

62. *In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig.*, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1175; see also Sidney A. Shapiro, *The Information Quality Act and Environmental Protection: The Perils of Reform by Appropriations Rider*, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 370-71 (2004).

63. Salt Brief, *supra* note 40 at 35; see also Greenwood, *supra* note 13, at B-9 (arguing that “the standards of the IQA, particularly when the specific provisions of the OMB Guidelines are considered,” have substance sufficient to provide for meaningful judicial review).

64. Shapiro, *supra* note 62, at 371.

65. Information Quality Act, *supra* note 1, §515(b)(2)(C).

66. Shapiro, *supra* note 62, at 371.

67. Information Quality Act Hearing (statement of William L. Kovacs), *supra* note 6.

68. Raju, *supra* note 6 (quoting official at U.S. Chamber of Commerce as saying “[a]ll options are on the table” and urging Congress to pass legislation establishing judicial review; also reporting that Rep. Candice Miller (R-Mich.), Chair of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs of the House Committee on Government Reform, “may propose legislation establishing judicial review under the act and possibly fold that into a package of reforms to reauthorize the Paperwork Reduction Act”); see also *OMB Downplays Impact of Data Quality Act on Federal Agencies*, *supra* note 5 (reporting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has indicated it will seek legislation amending the IQA to allow judicial review should it lose its appeal of the *Salt Institute* case, and that Representative Miller has “suggested she would offer legislation on the issue”); Manu Raju, *Industry, Key Republican Suspend Shift for Expanded Data Quality Act*, INSIDE EPA (July 20, 2005), at <http://www.insideepa.com> (quoting Representative Miller as stating that if the Fourth Circuit agrees with lower courts’ decisions that the IQA is not judicially reviewable, she would consider offering legislation amending the IQA to provide explicitly for judicial review).

loaded federal courts with challenges so technical as to be administratively impracticable.

#### A. Improper Delegation of Policy Questions to the Courts

Industry groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, one of the Salt Plaintiffs, view the IQA as much more than a mere “sunshine” or “good government” measure. Rather, to regulated entities such as those represented by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the IQA holds the potential to fundamentally alter the regulatory process, enabling them to cut off potential regulation at the pass. The IQA

empower[s] businesses to challenge not just government regulations—something they could do anyway—but scientific information that could potentially lead to regulation somewhere down the road. The Data Quality Act, Chamber of Commerce vice president William Kovacs explained in an interview, allows industry to influence the regulatory process from “the very beginning.”<sup>69</sup>

This is precisely the kind of agenda the Fourth Circuit has previously explained has no place in the courts. Judicial review of the “various results of controversial government research as soon as published but before they are given regulatory effect”<sup>70</sup> would be inappropriate, the court reasoned, because “such policy statements are properly challenged through the political process, not the courts.”<sup>71</sup> This reasoning holds true notwithstanding passage of the IQA. Although most IQA requests identify specific pieces of allegedly erroneous information, the vast majority are aimed at the underlying policy that the agency has adopted and that the information supports. Legislatively authorizing judicial review under the IQA would have impacts well beyond simply ensuring that agencies take their “information quality” responsibilities seriously. Rather, such a provision would go a long way toward delegating to the courts piecemeal a task that, if it is to be performed, must be performed by Congress wholesale.

IQA petitioners frequently target agency actions taken pursuant to environmental statutes by arguing that the underlying information suffers from some flaw while in reality attacking the agency’s precautionary use of information.<sup>72</sup> Such petitions challenge policy, not information.

Entities that file such challenges are not mere outliers, however—the OMB has explicitly encouraged this use of the IQA.

For analyses of risks to human health, safety, and the environment, the OMB’s IQA guidelines require that agencies “adopt or adapt” the stringent requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments (SDWAA) of 1996.<sup>73</sup> The SDWAA standards, in turn, establish a minimum quality of scientific data on which EPA can rely in the narrow context of setting contaminant limits in national drinking water regulations for public water systems. Specifically, EPA must “use the best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices” and “use data collected by accepted methods or best available methods . . . .”<sup>74</sup> In addition, the SDWAA standards indicate how EPA is to describe public health data to the public, including the stipulation that the Agency provide “the expected risk or central estimate of risk” for affected populations.<sup>75</sup>

By including the SDWAA standard for risk information in its IQA guidelines, the OMB attempts to force onto regulatory agencies a narrow view of regulation that Congress has written into one, arguably unique, statute.<sup>76</sup> Without support, the OMB asserts that in the SDWAA, Congress “adopted a basic standard of quality for the use of science in agency decisionmaking.”<sup>77</sup> As the Natural Resources Defense Council has explained, the OMB’s implication is that, across the board, “decision-makers can make judgments on how to apply the precautionary principle and other statutory

69. Chris Mooney, *Interrogations: Thanks to a Little-Known Piece of Legislation, Scientists at the EPA and Other Agencies Find Their Work Questioned Not Only by Industry, But by Their Own Government*, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2005, available at <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/08/28/interrogations?mode=PF> (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).

70. *Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA*, 313 F.3d 852, 862, 33 ELR 20113 (4th Cir. 2002).

71. *Id.* at 861.

72. Wendy E. Wagner, *Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act*, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 589, 601-02 (2004). Professor Wagner gives several examples of such instances: (1) an IQA challenge that sought to exclude studies of the hormonal effects of the pesticide Atrazine on frogs, which was not based on any technical issue but instead on a policy argument that new scientific discoveries cannot be considered in regulating pesticides until after the underlying methods have been formally promulgated by EPA; (2) a challenge to EPA’s barium risk assessment based in large part on the petitioner’s disagreement with EPA’s conservative assumptions used in preventative regulation; and (3) a challenge to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s use of models to predict the effects of global warming, which in reality targeted the basic policy decisions involved in deciding whether to suspend use of available models pending availability of a more robust dataset or model. *Id.*

73. OMB Guidelines, *supra* note 15, at 8460, §V.3.b.ii.C. (directing agencies to adopt or adapt standards set forth in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Amendments of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§300g-1(b)(3)(A) & (B)).

74. The SDWA provides:

(A) Use of science in decisionmaking

*In carrying out this section*, and, to the degree that an Agency action is based on science, the Administrator shall use—(i) the best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices; and (ii) data collected by accepted methods or best available methods (if the reliability of the method and the nature of the decision justifies use of the data).

42 U.S.C. §300g-1(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

75. The SDWA provides:

(B) Public information

*In carrying out this section*, the Administrator shall ensure that the presentation of information on public health effects is comprehensive, informative, and understandable. The Administrator shall, in a document made available to the public in support of a regulation promulgated under this section, specify, to the extent practicable—(i) each population addressed by any estimate of public health effects; (ii) the expected risk or central estimate of risk for the specific populations; (iii) each appropriate upper-bound or lower-bound estimate of risk; (iv) each significant uncertainty identified in the process of the assessment of public health effects and studies that would assist in resolving the uncertainty; and (v) peer-reviewed studies known to the Administrator that support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any estimate of public health effects and the methodology used to reconcile inconsistencies in the scientific data.

*Id.* §300g-1(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added).

76. MCGARITY ET AL., *supra* note 10, at 9.

77. OMB Guidelines, *supra* note 15, at 8457.

mandates on the basis of precise, ‘factual,’ numerically-based data.”<sup>78</sup> In reality, however, such widespread quantitative certainty is impossible. Based on large gaps in data on the quantity, chemical characteristics, and toxicology of even the most common pollutants, Congress passed statutes ensuring that both qualitative and quantitative information be used to inform the regulatory process.<sup>79</sup>

In addition to its attempt to import the SDWAA risk standards to all federal agencies through its guidelines, the OMB has directly urged petitioners to use the IQA to challenge “the inadequate treatment of uncertainty” and not merely errors in information. In its reports to Congress on the first years of IQA implementation, the OMB stated:

Thus far, the majority of non-frivolous correction requests have been denied, usually on the basis that a reasonable scientist could interpret the available information in the way the agency had. *Such correction requests might have been better focused if they had addressed the inadequate treatment of uncertainty rather than the accuracy of the information.*<sup>80</sup>

The ability of agencies to act in the face of incomplete information, however, was intentionally provided for by Congress, which had become “exasperated at the inability of the common law to adequately protect the public health and environment from toxic hazards.”<sup>81</sup> In recognition of those limitations, Congress passed a suite of statutes authorizing

regulation of potential environmental hazards “without requiring definitive evidence of harm . . . .”<sup>82</sup>

There is a critical distinction between incomplete information and poor quality information. Often, waiting to take regulatory action until definitive data is available concerning, for example, the nature of a particular chemical, its environmental fate, transport, and ultimate health effects on exposed populations will mean “many people can be harmed or the environment can be despoiled before the government acts.”<sup>83</sup> Therefore, the appropriate balance between information quality and adequate protection of public health and the environment is for agencies to take into account the quality of the available information but, when appropriate, to act upon (or disseminate) the best available evidence and not wait for more conclusive evidence to be discovered.<sup>84</sup> This balance is explicitly permitted by a variety of substantive statutes.<sup>85</sup>

The IQA threatens to undermine the precautionary approach mandated by Congress in such statutes by subjecting individual regulatory decisions to strict evidentiary standards once a petitioner (usually a regulated entity) files an information correction request. The proponents of IQA judicial review argue that the OMB guidelines—complete with their attempted imposition of the SDWAA standards onto risk information—should inform reviewing courts’ analyses of the propriety of agency action on IQA petitions.<sup>86</sup> Thus, judicial review of the IQA would provide an avenue for petitioners to chip away, through the courts, at a broad principle laid down by Congress in a host of authorizing statutes to better provide for protection of the environment and public health. The proper vehicle for such a broad policy shift is not an authorization for judicial review of the IQA but amendments to the health, safety, and environmental statutes themselves.

Moreover, authorizing judicial review of IQA requests would often mean asking the courts to resolve policy questions involved in agency judgments concerning the proper treatment of scientific information. Did the agency properly weigh its “information quality” obligations against the substantive, precautionary mandate set forth in the organic statute that the regulatory action implements? The IQA conceives the public interest as inhering in rigorous scientific

78. Rena Steinzor & Jennifer Mogy, Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council Regarding EPA Draft Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency, at 22 (May 31, 2002).

79. *Id.* at 25. For more information on the chemical “data gap,” see RENA I. STEINZOR ET AL., OVERCOMING “ENVIRONMENTAL DATA GAPS”: WHY WHAT EPA DOESN’T KNOW ABOUT TOXIC CHEMICALS CAN HURT (CPR, White Paper No. 510, 2005), available at [http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Data\\_Gaps\\_510.pdf](http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Data_Gaps_510.pdf) (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

80. OMB, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INFORMATION QUALITY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, FY 2003, at 8 (2004) (emphasis added), available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/fy03\\_info\\_quality\\_rpt.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/fy03_info_quality_rpt.pdf) (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). The statement is repeated, virtually verbatim, in the “Implementation of the Information Quality Act” section of the OMB’s 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation. See OMB, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 63 (2005), available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005\\_cb/final\\_2005\\_cb\\_report.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf) (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 COST BENEFIT REPORT].

81. See, e.g., Wagner, *supra* note 72, at 590 (citing, inter alia, ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 72 (3d ed. 2000)). As Professor Wagner points out in her article, the IQA threatens to impose upon the regulatory agencies an evidentiary screening test that looks very much like the vigorous *Daubert* test developed by the courts in 1993 and since implemented to scrutinize scientific evidence to determine whether it is “reliable” before proceeding to trial. *Id.* (citing, inter alia, *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 23 ELR 20979 (1993)). Professor Wagner explains that “there are important institutional differences between the agencies and the courts that could lead the IQA to be more damaging and potentially counterproductive as compared with the courts’ use of *Daubert*.” *Id.* For a discussion of the problems associated with *Daubert* as implemented by the courts, see LISA HEINZERLING, DOUBTING DAUBERT (Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 784689, Sept. 2005) (publication in BROOK. J.L. & POL’Y forthcoming), available at [http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Doubting\\_Daubert\\_511.pdf](http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Doubting_Daubert_511.pdf) (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

82. Wagner, *supra* note 72, at 590 (citing SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH ch. 3 (2003); Wagner, *supra* note 16, at 85-87).

83. Shapiro, *supra* note 62 at 351.

84. *Id.*

85. See MCGARITY, ET AL., *supra* note 10, at 9 (detailing different, less prescriptive mandates set forth in statutes other than the SDWAA concerning the nature of the evidence upon which an agency can rely, including the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. §§651-678, and the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR STAT. CAA §§101-618).

86. Salt Brief, *supra* note 40, at 23 (supporting its argument that the district court was incorrect in its conclusion that the IQA does not provide standards for a reviewing court to apply by: (1) noting that the “IQA provides that there shall be a process for ‘ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information . . . disseminated by an agency’”; (2) asserting that the OMB guidelines “explain at great length and implement what is meant by each statutory quality test mandated”; and (3) concluding that “[t]his is hardly a standard-less environment.”) See also Greenwood, *supra* note 13, at B-8 to B-9 (arguing that the IQA, “particularly when the specific provisions of the OMB Guidelines are considered,” provides adequate standards for judicial review).



proof. The organic statutes, on the other hand, recognize the importance of utilizing the best available information, but also the principle that “it is often wise to act before all the answers are in.” As the Supreme Court explained in responding to policy arguments advanced by the parties in the seminal case of *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council*,<sup>87</sup> the “responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: ‘Our constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.’”<sup>88</sup>

### *B. From Bad to Worse*<sup>89</sup>: *Furthering Ossification and Tilting the Balance*

Making the IQA judicially reviewable will amplify many of the Act’s negative impacts. Of particular concern is the potential for judicial review to further contribute to the “ossification” of information dissemination and, in some cases, regulatory action. Even without adding potential court challenges into the analysis, the IQA “opens the door for entities opposing the release of government information to use the appeals process to attempt to frustrate the dissemination of information that may alert the public about risks to them or to the environment.”<sup>90</sup> As Prof. Sidney Shapiro has explained, the prospect of judicial review of agency decisions on IQA petitions threatens to exacerbate the “ossification” of information dissemination:

If agencies find themselves defending dozens of information quality lawsuits, the dissemination of information to the public is likely to shrink. Agency resources will be diverted to defense of lawsuits, which will reduce resources that can be devoted to the dissemination of information. Moreover, the agency will likely involve its lawyers in the vetting of information in order to reduce such litigation, which will slow the dissemination of information to the public. Finally, in order to avoid these costs, agencies may simply reduce the amount of information that they disseminate.<sup>91</sup>

Further, although often defended as a mechanism to correct, for example, postings on agency websites, the OMB has interpreted the IQA to apply equally to agency dissemination of information during full-fledged rulemaking.<sup>92</sup> Petitioners have actively enlisted the IQA as another tool in the

proverbial antiregulatory arsenal.<sup>93</sup> Authorizing judicial review of agency decisions on IQA petitions could further stall rulemaking processes, as IQA petitioners sue agencies over the disposition of challenges to discrete bits of information within overall rulemaking records.

On a related note, even without the added layer of judicial review, the IQA creates an imbalance that favors regulated industries over public interest groups. As Prof. Wendy Wagner explains, “regulatory delay generally works at cross purposes with public interest groups’ goals of ensuring the expeditious promulgation of protective regulation.”<sup>94</sup> Thus, the IQA, by its very design, creates an imbalance by providing an additional opportunity for delay. Even those public interest groups who might wish to challenge agency information through the IQA, however, may be unable to fully compete on a playing field that is inherently tilted in favor of the technically sophisticated and resource endowed.<sup>95</sup> Extending the IQA petition process into the courts will exacerbate these imbalances by adding the resource demands of litigation onto the already resource-intensive IQA petition process.

### *C. Overloading the Federal Courts*

Would-be litigants are not the only parties whose resources an IQA judicial review provision would affect. Adding IQA cases to the federal judiciary’s workload will further burden a system already strained beyond its capacity. Congress has only authorized 179 court of appeals judgeships, 662 district judgeships, and 532 magistrate positions across the country.<sup>96</sup> The dockets of such courts are already filled to capacity. Inadequate funding for the federal court system has forced many courts to impose hiring freezes, furloughs, and reductions in force.<sup>97</sup> As former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist warned in his 2004 report, *Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary*, “[a]s the Judiciary’s workload continues to grow, the current budget constraints are bound to affect the ability of the federal courts efficiently and effectively to dispense justice.”<sup>98</sup>

The nature of IQA petitions filed thus far strongly suggests that courts frequently would be called upon to resolve complex questions involving scientific theory, a task that may evolve to more closely approximate the presiding over “mini-trials” than the review of administrative re-

87. 467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).

88. *Id.* at 865-66 (quoting *Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill*, 437 U.S. 153, 195, 8 ELR 20513 (1978)).

89. Manu Raju, *Industry, Key Republican Suspend Push for Expanded Data Quality Act*, INSIDE EPA (July 20, 2005), at <http://www.insideepa.com> (quoting Sidney A. Shapiro’s statement before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs of the House Committee on Government Reform that if Congress changed the IQA to provide for judicial review, it would make a “bad situation worse”).

90. Shapiro, *supra* note 62, at 358.

91. *Id.* at 368.

92. *Id.* at 347 (citing OMB Guidelines, *supra* note 15, at 8457); see also COPELAND & SIMPSON, *supra* note 7, at 7 (explaining that although the OMB has stated that agencies should handle correction requests submitted during the public comment period for a rule through the APA commenting process, if they are dissatisfied with the agency’s handling of the correction request during the APA process, they could appeal the agency’s decision through the agency’s IQA administrative appeal process).

93. See, e.g., Letter from E. Donald Elliott, Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher L.L.P., to Information Quality Guidelines Office, U.S. EPA (June 2, 2004) available at <http://www.epa.gov/quality/information-guidelines/documents/04020.pdf> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) (challenging information underlying state implementation plans required under the CAA); Letter from Reed D. Rubinstein, Greenberg Traurig, to Information Quality Guidelines Staff, U.S. EPA (Aug. 30, 2004), available at <http://www.epa.gov/quality/information-guidelines/documents/04023.pdf> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) (challenging information underlying the proposed listing of a contaminated site on the Superfund national priorities list).

94. Wagner, *supra* note 72, at 608.

95. *Id.*

96. See Federal Judicial Center, *How the Federal Courts Are Organized*, at <http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/0/a783011af949b6bf85256b35004ad214?opendocument> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

97. CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2 (Jan. 1, 2005), available at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

98. *Id.* at 3.

cords.<sup>99</sup> As of December 2004, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the total number of federal government civilian employees is 2.7 million.<sup>100</sup> As the federal workforce goes about performing its collective job duties, untold amounts of information are “disseminated,” within the meaning of the OMB’s IQA guidelines, on a daily basis.<sup>101</sup> The potential for swamping the courts with information correction requests is therefore enormous.

IQA proponents, including the staff of the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which administers the Act, argue that because only approximately 85 “substantive” IQA requests have been filed thus far, there is no reason to be concerned that IQA use will increase dramatically in the future.<sup>102</sup> This wishful thinking is not con-

vincing, especially if the question on the table is whether to open the federal courts to those disaffected by federal information dissemination. The IQA has been in effect for no more than three years, if one dates its implementation to the final issuance of OMB and agency guidance regarding the implementation of the Act. The George W. Bush Administration has not been activist in the regulatory arena. Further, the absence of complaints could just as easily be read to demonstrate that there are no major problems with the quality of information used by the federal government.

At the very least, Congress should be very wary about expanding the Act’s scope to enmesh the federal judiciary in resolving such disputes without doing a more extensive analysis of the potential impact on litigation—criminal and civil—that is far more important.

## VI. Conclusion

In the wake of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in the *Salt Institute* case, some proponents of the IQA plan to pursue appeals in different circuits, while others are calling upon Congress for legislative relief. Before accepting at face value the simplistic position that the IQA is a mere “good government” statute that agencies will only take seriously if enforced by the courts, Congress must consider the arguments against making the IQA judicially reviewable. In order to ensure that such concerns are carefully weighed, it is imperative that any such proposal—unlike the IQA as originally passed—be the subject of hearing and debate.

99. Wagner, *supra* note 72, at 607 (noting that the *Daubert* test, discussed *supra*, note 81, has been criticized for causing greater imbalances in adversarial processes because of the high costs associated with mounting and defending *Daubert* challenges and citing, *inter alia*, Ellen Relkin, *To Hear or Not to Hear: When Are Daubert Hearings Appropriate?*, SF78 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 371, 375 (2001) (reporting that *Daubert* hearings can range from a few hours to numerous days and have evolved into virtual mini-trials involving a myriad of experts from both sides that can cost parties “tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars”).

100. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY FUNCTION: DECEMBER 2004, available at <http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/04fedfun.txt> (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

101. The IQA does not define the term “disseminated.” See Information Quality Act, *supra* note 1. However, the OMB’s IQA guidelines broadly define “dissemination” as “agency initiated or sponsored distribution of information to the public.” OMB Guidelines, *supra* note 15, at 8460, §V.8.

102. See, e.g., 2005 COST BENEFIT REPORT, *supra* note 80, at 64.