If at First You Find the Truth, Try, Try Again
Under the guise of
scientific inquiry and worker safety, a taxpayer funded effort is helping
corporate America avoid legal responsibility for poisoning hundreds of thousands
of Americans with asbestos. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health has proposed a roadmap that purportedly seeks to minimize the potential
for asbestos disease.[1] In fact, the roadmap and its vast melding of tax
dollars, federal bureaucracy, and industry cronies seek to protect asbestos
defendants from valid claims by mesothelioma victims by showing that chrysotile
asbestos is harmless, in contravention of almost one hundred years of clinical
research.
The only two significant remaining issues for asbestos
manufacturers after more than a century of wantonly poisoning millions”and
earning billions”are defending mesothelioma lawsuits and defeating a ban on
asbestos. The reasons are simple: asbestos lawsuits have bankrupted more than 85
companies since 1976, with more sure to follow,[2] and asbestos is still a
profitable poison to sell in this country.[3]
These are not your
grandfather’s bankruptcies, however, where bankruptcy meant that the company got
liquidated, laid off all its employees, and wrecked the local economy.[4] The
asbestos bankruptcy sham isn’t really a bankruptcy at all. It’s a legal
sleight-of-hand that spins off the corporation’s legal liability by creating a
trust fund to “compensate” victims. The sick and dying victims are then forced
to hash it out with corporate lawyers, trust bureaucrats, and insurance
companies, while being deprived of getting justice via direct lawsuits against
the poisoner. The original mammoth bankrupt, Johns-Manville, has emerged from
faux bankruptcy and today enjoys over $2.5 billion in annual sales.[5] An
analysis of asbestos bankruptcies shows that the spin-off process has made them
stronger, leaner, and profitable.[6] For the mesothelioma victims poisoned by
these companies’ deliberate use of asbestos, the outcome has been less rosy.
Victims of Johns-Manville who thought that they would be compensated soon found
that the trust fund was tottering on the brink of bankruptcy after a few short
years”in the old-fashioned sense, of course”so that they received only a
pittance of the pittance they’d originally been promised.[7]
Not-so-covert
Operation
The NIOSH roadmap is a sharp arrow pointed squarely at the heart of
mesothelioma victims. Asbestos defendants know that there is no asbestos
litigation crisis. There is no logjam in the courts, courts are not buckling
under the weight of the asbestos caseload, and the peak of cases has passed.[8]
Since faux-bankruptcies allow companies to quickly spin off their asbestos
liabilities, and since the only detailed review of asbestos litigation as it
relates to the supposed litigation crisis decisively concludes that there is
none,[9] the only two issues left on the table are mesothelioma lawsuits and the
ability to keep peddling the poison for a profit.
Mesothelioma litigation is
one of the only avenues to the courthouse left for asbestos victims, and to get
there the claimant usually has to die, since mesothelioma has the poorest of
prognoses. But once in court, the victim has a good chance of getting some form
of justice in the few states that haven’t shut the courthouse door to asbestos
victims. Con Edison and Long Island Lighting Co. in New York got tagged with a
$41 million verdict[10] a few years back, and defendants live in terror of the
eight-digit judgments that outraged juries hand down in select
jurisdictions.
When a patient with mesothelioma worked in the right job and
got exposed to asbestos from the right products, he has a great case because the
only cause of mesothelioma is asbestos. Unfortunately, the price for his great
case is typically a slow and painful death. Asbestos manufacturers that have not
yet sought faux-bankruptcy protection have therefore made it their single
biggest priority to prove that even though asbestos indisputably causes
mesothelioma, “their” type of asbestos does not.
Enter NIOSH and the
roadmap.
Truth or Consequence?
Science has been political since Galileo
recanted to the Inquisitors-General. But from the time the great astronomer
retracted his heliocentric ideas in 1633, the general trend has been to insist
on greater objectivity and less politics in science. Federal agencies like the
EPA and NIOSH have historically been regarded as purveyors of reasonably
de-politicized scientific inquiry. The Bush administration, however, has
fast-tracked governmental science right back to the 17th Century.
Industry
has seized on a number of administration initiatives as an indication that the
time is ripe to churn out some old-fashioned junk science on the issue of how
much of what kind of asbestos causes what kind of cancer how often in whom. The
administration has favored junk science initiatives that cover a wide range of
health and science related issues, and that have encouraged industry operatives
with a wink and a nod about the new direction of science in government.
With
respect to global warming, the administration’s strategy has been to question it
at every turn.[11] The core policy of the administration has been to increase
fossil fuel consumption while playing semantic games that exacerbate the
problem,[12] if there is a problem, which they deny. Even when the EPA endorsed
the idea that human activities such as oil refining, power plants, and
automobile emissions are important causes of global warming, Bush dismissed them
as “bureaucrats.”[13] Stem cell research, another province of hard science, has
met with great resistance from the President. In 2001 he limited federal funding
for embryonic stem cell research to cell lines already in existence, but the
twenty lines still in use have become genetically degraded and are now
ill-suited for research.[14] Bush’s non-scientific decision flew in the face of
the National Institutes of Health, who have concluded that research on human
embryonic stem cells offers great promise for curing Parkinson’s disease, heart
disease, Alzheimer’s disease, spinal cord injury, and diabetes.[15] An equally
blind and cynical eye was turned to mercury emissions,[16] tobacco,[17] air
pollution,[18] and science in general, as the President declared his ideas about
intelligent design on a scientific par with those of Charles Darwin by insisting
they be taught in the classroom.[19] Asbestos industry operatives have been
keenly watching the presidency for cues as they ramp up their assault on
well-established notions of the asbestos toxicity in the waning days of the Bush
Administration.
Silence of the Dead
Junk science and suppression of data
are old friends to the asbestos industry. Chronicling the lies and cover-ups by
asbestos defendants would occupy thousands of pages, and has been reviewed in
depth by Castleman,[20] among others. Legal discovery in litigation has been
responsible for uncovering much of the hard proof that of wrongdoing by the
asbestos defendants. A brief recap, however, is appropriate because what is
happening in the 2007 NIOSH roadmap bears uncanny resemblance to what happened
decades ago.
In the 1920’s the medical community recognized that the fibrotic
lung condition later known as asbestosis was caused by, of all things, exposure
to asbestos.[21] By 1933, hired gun scientist, physician, and public health
expert Anthony Lanza told asbestos company doctors that he didn’t think the
hazards of asbestos warranted warning labels or posters in view of the
“extraordinary” legal repercussions of telling the truth.[22] The asbestos
industry, with its lawyers, insurers, and hired scientists, laid the foundation
in the early 30’s for future concerted action to conceal research findings about
asbestos and cancer.[23] In addition to doctoring scientific studies, publishing
redacted science in peer-reviewed journals, and having asbestos industry
business managers review and edit scientific research,[24] the history of
America’s worst public health disaster has been largely caused by industry
fraud.
Past behavior is always a useful referent for future performance. As
NIOSH embarks on its industry-approved roadmap, it is helpful to remember that
the strategy for asbestos companies has always centered on delay. In 1950,
asbestos corporate officials had already committed to a firm policy of
“epidemiology” and “causation,” the very two issues still being “debated” more
than half a century later. In recommending an epidemiologic approach, the
medical officer for Johns-Manville also opined that, “We would be wise to wait
until we have proof of no causal relationship between asbestosis and pulmonary
cancer…”[25]
It’s 2007, and the draft language from NIOSH’s roadmap indicates
that they’re still waiting: “Yet, as we enter the 21st Century, many questions
and areas of scientific uncertainty remain…Most importantly, the Roadmap
outlines a research program that will provide answers to current scientific
questions, reduce scientific uncertainties, and provide a sound scientific
foundation for future policy development.”[26]
Johns-Manville couldn’t have
said it better.
Endless Doubt
Asbestos defendants have a simple strategy
for defeating valid mesothelioma claims in court: raise the level of uncertainty
about science in order to keep it from the jury. Judges have been reluctant to
keep out evidence where reasonable scientists disagree. So the asbestos
defendants have chosen to raise the level of uncertainty about science in order
to delay the use of knowledge about chrysotile toxicity for purposes of OSHA
decision-making, and to limit public awareness of an issue affecting public or
environmental health.
The backbone of the strategy to bring NIOSH to its
knees vis-à-vis asbestos science begins with the insidious Information Quality
Act, the brainchild of anti-regulation, pro-business lobbyist, trade council
hack, voyeur, and self-confessed “dirty old man” Jim Tozzi.[27] The American
Chamber of Commerce claimed that the law would “have a revolutionary impact on
the regulatory process.”[28] Public interest groups claim that it has become a
tool that special interest groups can use to avoid regulation forever.[29] Both
have been proven correct.
With regard to asbestos science the jury is already
in”or out and not coming back, if you’re a mesothelioma victim”on whether the
act exists to promote quality data or exclude good science from agency
regulations. On August 19, 2003, the asbestos defense firm Morgan, Lewis and
Bockius[30] filed a petition with the EPA challenging a 1986 publication,
“Guidance for Preventing Asbestos Disease among Auto Mechanics.”[31] Morgan
Lewis claimed that the publication, known as EPA’s Gold Book, flunked the
requirements of the Information Quality Act. Pursuant to the act, they claimed
the data was inadequate, inappropriate, outdated, and in conflict with
subsequent studies. Then they launched an all-out attack on the Gold Book
claiming that verification of the publications origins, preparations, funding,
review, and approval of the booklet are unknown.
Why all this fuss about an
EPA publication that says in plain language:
1. Asbestos disease should be
prevented among auto mechanics
2. Asbestos causes disease
4. Asbestos is
easy to breathe and ingest
5. Proper work practices will reduce
exposure
The fuss, of course, is that the automotive industry is terrified of
mesothelioma lawsuits from auto mechanics. Brakes and clutches contain
chrysotile asbestos. If chrysotile is dangerous enough for the government to
warn, then the companies may ultimately be liable for their failure to
warn”especially since they knew of the danger. The only solution, as they see
it, is to prove that it’s not dangerous, or that the science is so complex and
uncertain that they couldn’t have known.
Morgan Lewis’s challenge framed the
innocuous publication as one intended to change the work-behavior practices of
an entire industry and, because it relied on information from scientific
sources, as one that must meet the rigorous standard for “influential
information.” The key admission as to what was really driving their concern over
the publication, however, was Morgan Lewis’s note that during litigation the
Gold Book is routinely proffered as evidence of EPA’s current position and
thinking on whether asbestos-containing friction products are dangerous to
users.[32] Morgan Lewis cared zero about the quality of the data, and everything
about its admissibility in court.
EPA caved in, approving most of the
petition and promising to put out a new brochure, which it did.[33] OSHA then
took over, as it came to do the bidding of the asbestos defendants and their
lawyers. Unlike the Gold Book, which begins with the phrase “preventing asbestos
disease among auto mechanics,” OSHA’s new document begins with a legal
disclaimer: “[this bulletin] is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no
new legal obligations.” The Gold Book talks about latency, asbestosis,
mesothelioma, and lung cancer”evils caused by asbestos beyond any shred of
scientific doubt, and the book instructs “there is no known level of exposure to
asbestos below which health effects do not occur.” In contrast, OSHA’s 2006
bulletin includes exactly 27 words about health effects of asbestos. The
document assures readers that asbestos use is declining, that newer cars may not
use such products, and that nothing in the bulletin is to be taken as a
standard, requirement, or regulation. It’s more like free advice, worth pretty
much what it costs.
And what about the scientific quality of the government’s
new booklet under the Information Quality Act? The original Gold Book was
documented with 37 footnotes. The new OSHA brochure? One.
Tilting the
Panel
The NIOSH draft roadmap, developed with the help of NIOSH scientists
and engineers with combined experience in toxicology, epidemiology, industrial
hygiene, analytical chemistry, and other disciplines, is forty-seven pages long.
It includes a glossary, extensive footnotes, graphs, and even a list of
acronyms. But nowhere in the document does it provide the long list of names of
the scientists, engineers, and others who supposedly developed the
report.
Nor is this a harmless oversight. The roadmap’s peer review panel is
carefully composed of three unabashed “chrysotile doesn’t cause meso” members,
one asbestos victim advocate, and five members who have expertise in various
areas. None is an advocate for the proven scientific proposition that chrysotile
causes mesothelioma. Ann G. Wylie, mineralogist at the University of Maryland,
most recently worked as the principal investigator for a $508,000 grant funded
by GM, Chrysler-Daimler, and Ford,[34] in case anyone’s wondering where she
stands on chrysotile asbestos as it relates to automotive brakes. Wylie also is
an unabashed proponent of the idea that exposure limits need to be revised via
reclassification of asbestos fibers[35]”and she’s not suggesting downward,
either. This reclassification”or research, as it’s called in the roadmap”is
precisely what NIOSH has been tasked by industry to do: allow lots of exposure
to chrysotile.
Brooke Mossman from the University of Vermont is another rabid
asbestos apologist on the peer review panel. In addition to a Scientific
American article where she reminds readers that chrysotile is “safer” than other
forms of asbestos, and that other countries find asbestos of great utility,[36]
Mossman defends one of her papers by quoting an epidemiologist who suggests that
chrysotile may not cause mesothelioma at all.[37] The real aim of the roadmap is
to find a path out of the last century of medical research, and find a way back
to the days when Dr. Lanza could authoritatively tell fellow physicians that
there really was no need for warnings about asbestos. Unlike Lanza, who was at
least honest enough to admit that the reason for suppressing scientific facts
was fear of litigation, the new crop of NIOSH hacks are hell-bent on simply
denying the science.
In case the panel’s hue in terms of chrysotile toxicity
weren’t sufficiently in favor of asbestos defendants, Morton Lippman also came
along for the ride. Lippman believes that any fiber less than 5µ (happens to
include most chrysotile fibers) is harmless. When the Carpenter Report clearly
explained that even though short fibers might be less carcinogenic than long
fibers, the fact that short fibers greatly outnumbered long fibers in Lower
Manhattan after 9/11 and thus might cause more disease than long ones, Lippman
accused Carpenter of “fear-mongering” in raising the short fiber
issue.[38]
Since the NIOSH roadmap covers an extraordinary scope”“a research
program that will provide answers to the current scientific questions, reduce
scientific uncertainties, and provide a sound scientific foundation for future
policy development””it is remarkable that three pure pro-chrysotile reviewers
would be on the peer review panel of only nine people, unless of course the real
purpose of the roadmap was not to provide answers to current scientific
questions but to chart a course for GM, Ford, and Chrysler-Daimler so that they
may continue using chrysotile in their brakes and clutches, while helping
chrysotile defendants avoid liability in court.
So How Dangerous IS
Chrysotile?
Given the 3,000-4,000 Americans who die every year from
mesothelioma, and have been doing so for decades, that the question is being
asked at all is an offense against humanity. While asbestos defendants in this
country dredge up the old arguments about the harmlessness of chrysotile, the
rest of the world is working overtime to ban it. As of 2007, chrysotile has been
banned by Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Finland, Italy, Germany, Kuwait, France, Poland, Monaco, Belgium, Saudi Arabia,
Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Brazil, Latvia, Chile, Argentina, Spain,
Luxembourg, Uruguay, Australia, Honduras, South Africa, Japan, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia,
Egypt, Jordan, Croatia, New Caledonia, Gabon, and the Seychelles.[39]
What do
they know that we don’t? Nothing.
The World Health Organization classifies
chrysotile as a carcinogen, period.[40] The International Agency for Research on
Cancer is emphatic that it is not possible to assess whether there is an
exposure level below which an increased risk of cancer will not occur.[41] The
IARC classifies chrysotile as a carcinogen, and clearly states that although
other types of asbestos create a higher risk for mesothelioma, some cases of
mesothelioma do occur as a result of exposure to chrysotile.[42]
While
asbestos defendants gleefully seize on the fact that chrysotile isn’t the most
potent cause of mesothelioma, they forget that OSHA and EPA’s mandates aren’t
only to ban the most potent causes of mesothelioma, but to make the workplace
safer. Chrysotile is a carcinogen, case closed. From an occupational safety
regulatory standpoint, what difference does it make to NIOSH whether mechanics
are more likely to get mesothelioma or lung cancer? The substance is clearly
dangerous, so get rid of it.
The answer, of course, is that the NIOSH roadmap
is not set up to get asbestos carcinogens out of the workplace”everyone, even
its most rabid apologists, agrees that chrysotile is a carcinogen. The NIOSH
roadmap is, rather, set up to prove that chrysotile doesn’t cause mesothelioma.
A greater perversion of a workplace safety research institute could hardly be
imagined.
However at odds with public health or occupational safety, the real
NIOSH inquiry is “Does this otherwise lethal carcinogen also cause
mesothelioma?” The answer is also “yes.” A 25-year longitudinal study in China
conducted by Chinese, Japanese, and American researchers showed that chrysotile
alone causes mesothelioma. [43] This debunks the industry claim that only
non-chrysotile forms of asbestos are to blame, and it confirms what doctors have
been seeing for a century: even if chrysotile is less deadly, when the
concentrations are high enough it causes lots and lots of
mesothelioma.
NIOSH’s mandate is to protect workers. Abating asbestos and
strictly enforcing dust suppression laws saves lives. Supporting the Ban
Asbestos Act and putting teeth into workplace safety regulations fit neatly with
OSHA’s mission. Empanelling junk scientists and churning out draft roadmaps fit
the mission of asbestos defendants seeking a silver bullet to slay products
liability litigation and to let them continue hawking their deadly wares.
Can
We Please Go Home?
There is no compelling scientific, regulatory, medical, or
policy reason to invest public money in an effort to establish that chrysotile
doesn’t cause mesothelioma. Such research seeks to exculpate the fiber types
that were used in 95% of all commercial and industrial applications, usage
levels that fit neatly with the thousands of mesothelioma deaths every year in
this country, and fit even more neatly with the Chinese study that shows how
more exposure will lead to more mesothelioma.
No research will ever exculpate
asbestos defendants’ products as pure chrysotile, because reasonable scientists
differ over whether pure chrysotile even exists.[44] In addition, most of the
asbestos used through the 1970’s, which is the source of the current
mesothelioma scourge, was contaminated with amphibole/tremolite fibers. Sixty
years ago asbestos manufacturers tried to escape blame for the public health
crisis by pointing the finger at South African blue asbestos. Now they’re doing
it again, except this time it’s with taxpayer dollars and the weight of a
federal agency.
NIOSH should stop wasting resources on its sham roadmap.
NIOSH should start investing money in finding a cure for mesothelioma. NIOSH
should use its resources to come up with scientific findings that will help OSHA
make the workplace safer by banning asbestos products. It really is that
simple.
[1] Middendorf, Paul, Ralph Zumwalde, and Robert Castellan, “Asbestos and
other mineral fibers: a roadmap for scientific research,” by on behalf of the
NIOSH Mineral Fibers Work Group, Feb. 2007
[2] J.T. Thorpe: A Case Study,
Brian L. Davidoff and Jeanne C. Wanlass, www.Lawjournalnewsletters.com, April
2007
[3] Virta, Robert L., Asbestos: Geology, Mineralogy, Mining, and Uses,
U.S. Geological Survey, 2002,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2002/of02-149/of02-149.pdf. “In the U.S., the major use
in roofing compounds (62%), followed by gaskets (22%) and friction products
(11%).
[4] Mayerson, Marc, InsuranceScrawl.com, Mar. 2006. The first step in
an asbestos-driven bankruptcy is to take the asbestos claims stream and estimate
its value. The debtor then needs to satisfy that creditor claim in the
bankruptcy, which it does by setting up a trust and funding it with cash (from
itself and sometimes its corporate parent), stock, and preexisting insurance
rights. The debtor receives a channeling injunction that bars the assertion of
any asbestos-related claim against itself (and sometimes against non-debtors,
see Susan Power Johnston and Katherine Porter, Extension of Section 524(g) of
the Bankruptcy Code to Nondebtor Parents, Affiliates, and Transaction Parties,
59 Business Lawyer 511-12 (2004)), and the injunction furthermore funnels all
claims to the trust. In other words, the debtor is able to emerge from
bankruptcy shorn of its asbestos liabilities without fear of any future claims.
The trust in turn is charged with resolving the asbestos claims and sets up an
administrative compensation process, usually with relaxed standards of proof, to
“adjudicate” the tort claims. The claimant may have the right further to bring
an action in court, though with no ability to seek punitive damages for example.
This is the model that was used in the Manville bankruptcy and was confirmed,
expanded, and modified by Congress in 1994 when the bankruptcy code was amended
with the addition of section 524(g), 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), a provision specially
designed to deal with asbestos-driven bankruptcies. While certain procedural and
substantive changes were implemented in 524(g), from the debtor’s perspective
one key was that 524(g) made clear that future claims, claims by persons exposed
to asbestos but who at the time of the bankruptcy filing had no legal claim,
would have their claims channeled to the trust as well. Dealing with “futures”
has been the Achilles heel of several non-bankruptcy deals in the class-action
context, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997), so the express conferral of power on bankruptcy courts to limit
the right to sue of future claimants was quite significant. [Insurance Scrawl
was profiled in The Wall Street Journal’s “Guide to the Blogs Insiders Read to
Stay Current.” (11/16/05), and described as “influential” and a “must read,” for
keeping “editorializing to a minimum,” while providing analysis with “weight”
that “dissect[s]” court opinions and addresses the “nuances.”]
[5] SEIDA
annual report, 2005, http://www.seida.info/downloads/2005AnnualReport.pdf
[6]
Benston, George J., Professor, “Financial Analysis of Companies that Filed for
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2000 and 2001 as a Result of Asbestos Obligations,”
Oct. 2003, http://www.ewg.org/reports/asbestos/facts/fact2.php
[7] Zirin,
James D., of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Dow Jones Company, 2001. To date,
after some more judicial intervention, the trust has settled with an additional
55,000 claimants and paid a total of $2 billion to victims of asbestos exposure,
mostly on a basis of 10 cents on the dollar.
[8] “Asbestos Cases in the
Courts: No Logjam,” Public Citizen, Feb. 2006,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NoLogJam.pdf
[9] “Asbestos Cases in the
Courts: No Logjam,” Public Citizen, Feb. 2006,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NoLogJam.pdf
[10] Croteau v. Consolidated
Edison, No. 118793/01 (New York Co., N.Y., Sup. Ct.)
[11] The Guardian, April
4, 2004
[12] Mieszkowski, K., “Bush: Global warming is just hot air,” Salon,
Sep. 10, 2004. “The core of the Bush policy was a voluntary goal of reducing
emissions ‘intensity’ by 18 percent by 2012,” says Aimee Christensen, executive
director of Environment 2004, a political action group. So what the policy
really calls for”but does not require”is a mere 4 percent reduction in
intensity. What’s lost in the discussion about “emissions intensity” says
Christensen, is that actual greenhouse gas emissions will increase 12 percent.
Compare that to the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, which would have mandated
that by 2012 the U.S. return to emission levels 7 percent below those of 1990,
or the McCain/Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act, which asked that the U.S.
return to year 2000 levels of emissions. Both those plans would result in actual
reductions, not just intensity reductions. The Bush administration walked away
from the first proposal on the international stage and opposed the second here
at home.
[13] CBS/AP News, June 4, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/03/tech/main510920.shtml
[14] Los
Angeles Times, March 20, 2007
[15] NIH, Stem Cells: Scientific Progress and
Future Research Directions (June 2001)
[16] Committee policy hearing on
administration’s proposed mercury emissions rules, July 9, 2004. “Vermont’s U.S.
Senators Patrick Leahy and Jim Jeffords Friday led a hearing to examine the Bush
Administration’s proposal on mercury emissions from power plants. The nation’s
1,100 coal-burning power plants emit about 48 tons of mercury each year, the
largest unregulated U.S. source. Witnesses, including former Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) officials, testified that the Administration proposal
allows for more mercury pollution than current law and is much less protective
of public health. Jeffords, the ranking member of the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee said, “Sadly, the Bush Administration’s proposal on
mercury pollution from power plants appears to do little to protect public
health, especially in the short term. The proposed Administration rule calls for
a permanent delay in serious reductions and would achieve far less in cleanup
than is possible with today’s technologies and is required by the Clean Air Act.
Also, it lets more than 200 power plants buy their way out of controlling these
toxic emissions for 20 years or more.”
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200407/070904.html
[17] Washington Post, Mar.
22, 2007. The leader of the Justice Department team that prosecuted a landmark
lawsuit against tobacco companies said yesterday that Bush administration
political appointees repeatedly ordered her to take steps that weakened the
government’s racketeering case. Sharon Y. Eubanks said Bush loyalists in
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales’s office began micromanaging the team’s
strategy in the final weeks of the 2005 trial, to the detriment of the
government’s claim that the industry had conspired to lie to U.S.
smokers.
[18] President George W. Bush, April 20, 2007,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/environment/. “By encouraging cooperative
conservation, innovation, and new technologies, my Administration has compiled a
strong environmental record. This Earth Day, harmful air pollutant levels are
down more than ten percent since 2001. Millions more Americans are drinking
cleaner, safer water. We have removed hazardous fuels from more than 19 million
acres of federal land. We have created, restored, or protected more than 2.5
million acres of wetlands, and we have conserved almost 200 million of acres of
habitat through Farm Bill conservation programs. And we are taking positive
steps to confront the important challenge of climate change. Our work is not
done. We also have a responsibility to pass on to future generations our
commitment to the environment.” Contrast this with an analysis of the Clear
Skies plan that shows it will weaken and delay health protections already
required under the law, set weaker targets for emissions of sulfur dioxide,
mercury, and nitrogen oxides from U.S. power plants, fail to include a single
measure to reduce or even limit the growth of carbon dioxide, and hamstring
efforts to cut pollution from old coal-fired plants. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Sep. 4, 2003, http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/qbushplan.asp.
[19]
Washington Post, Aug. 3, 2005. President Bush invigorated proponents of teaching
alternatives to evolution in public schools with remarks saying that
schoolchildren should be taught about “intelligent design,” a view of creation
that challenges established scientific thinking and promotes the idea that an
unseen force is behind the development of humanity.
[20] Castleman, B.,
“Asbestos: Medical and legal aspects,” 1986
[21] “The Silence: The Asbestos
Industry and Early Occupational Cancer Research”A Case Study,” Lilienfeld,
David, M.D., American Journal of Public Health, 1991, Vol. 81, No. 6
[22]
Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Asbestos and Other Mineral
Fibers: A Roadmap for Scientific Research, NIOSH, Feb. 2007
[27] Washington
Monthly, May 2004. Tozzi’s Information Quality Act, codified at 44 U.S.C.
3504(d)(1) and 3516, has led to suits challenging a government report on climate
change and a National Institutes of Health study on diet, both of which
represent state-of-the-art scientific work in their fields. The latter suit was
recently filed by the Chamber of Commerce and the Salt Institute, an industry
group, as a strategic test case to establish judicial review under the Data
Quality Act. Slowly, Tozzi and allies are laying the groundwork for a broader
assault on the regulatory state. Data quality, says Kovacs, is going to have “a
revolutionary impact on the regulatory process.”
[28] The Information Quality
Act: OMB’s Guidance and Initial Implementation, Congressional Research Service,
Sep. 17, 2004.
[29] Id.
[30] Information Quality Act petition, Aug. 19,
2003
[31] EPA publication, June 1986
[32] Information Quality Act
petition, id.
[33] Asbestos”Automotive Brake and Clutch Repair Work, OSHA,
Jul. 26, 2006, http://www.osha.gov/dts/shib/shib072606.html#1
[34] Ann G.
Wylie curriculum vitae
[35] Wylie, A., The Importance of Width in Asbestos
Fiber Carcinogenicity and its Implications for Public Policy, American
Industrial Hygiene Association journal, Jun. 1993. “Evidence from human
epidemiology, experimental animal implantation and inoculation studies, and lung
burden studies shows that fibers with widths greater than 1 µm are not
implicated in the occurrence of lung cancer or mesothelioma. Furthermore, it is
generally believed that certain fibers thinner than a few tenths of a micrometer
must be abundant in a fiber population in order for them to be a causative agent
for mesothelioma. These conclusions are fully consistent with the mineralogical
characteristics of asbestos fibers, which, as fibrils, have widths of less than
1 µm and, as bundles, easily dissagregate into fibrils. Furthermore, the
biological behavior of various habits of tremolite shows a clear dose-response
relationship and provides evidence for a threshold between fiber width and tumor
experience in animals. Public policy in regulating mineral fibers should
incorporate this knowledge by altering the existing federal asbestos fiber
definitions to reflect it.”
[36] “Asbestos Revisited,” Scientific American,
July 1997
[37] Environmental Health Perspectives Volume 102, Number 5, May
1994
[38] NYCOSH Update on Safety and Health, Vol. VIII, No. 22, March 16,
2005
[39] International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, 2006
[40] International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), 1998, Summaries & Evaluations:
ASBESTOS
(Actinolite, amosite, anthophyllite, chrysotile, crocidolite,
tremolite), (Group 1)
[41] IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic
Risks to Humans, Vol. 14, Asbestos,
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol14/volume14.pdf
[42] IARC
Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, Vol. 2, Some
Inorganic and Organometallic Compounds,
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol2/volume2.pdf
[43] Cancer
Mortality among Workers Exposed to Amphibole-free Chrysotile Asbestos, American
Journal of Epidemiology Vol. 154, No. 6 : 538-543, 2001. The issue of whether
exposure to chrysotile asbestos alone, without contamination from amphibole
asbestos, causes lung cancer and mesothelioma was investigated in a 25-year
longitudinal study (1972″1996) in Chongqin, China. The study cohort comprised
515 male asbestos plant workers exposed to chrysotile only; the control cohort
included 650 non-dust-exposed workers. The results of analysis in which the
proportional hazards model was used indicated that mortality due to all causes,
all cancers, and lung cancer was related to asbestos exposure; the relative
risks, adjusted for age and smoking, were 2.9, 4.3, and 6.6, respectively. Fiber
concentrations in the raw material section and the textile section of the plant
were 7.6 and 4.5 fibers/ml, respectively. Because of differences between the
study and control plants, the authors also compared various sections of the
asbestos plant that had different levels of dust exposure. The adjusted relative
risk of lung cancer was 8.1 for workers exposed to high versus low levels of
asbestos. Two cases of malignant mesothelioma, one pleural and the other
peritoneal, were found in the asbestos cohort. These results suggest that heavy
exposure to pure chrysotile asbestos alone, with negligible amphibole
contamination, can cause lung cancer and malignant mesothelioma in exposed
workers.
[44] Analysis of Amphibole Asbestos in Chrysotile and Other
Minerals, Addison, J., and L.S.T. Davies, Annals of Occupational Hygiene, Vol.
34, No. 2, pp. 159-175, 1990. Chrysotile asbestos and many other mineral raw
materials contain amphibole minerals which may be asbestiform. There is
currently no analytical method which will detect the presence of amphibole at
sufficiently low limits to preclude the possibility of inadvertent exposure of
persons handling these materials to hazardous airborne fiber concentrations. A
method of chemical digestion of chrysotiles has been tested with regard to the
determination of their tremolite contaminant content and this has been applied
to a range of chrysotile and other minerals. The method improves the sensitivity
of the amphibole analysis at least 10-fold giving detection limits of 0.01″0.05%
in chrysotile by X-ray diffractometry (XRD). The difficulties arising from
compositional and morphological variations are discussed in the context of the
potential hazards from airborne fibers and the relative values of analyses by
XRD, infra red spectrophotometry (IR) and electron microscopy. It is concluded
that XRD and IR are useful as screening methods for the detection of amphibole
in chrysotile but other materials should be analyzed by optical or electron
microscopy.
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