From: Intelligent Utility
By Matthew M. Blizard, Celia Y. David & Kenneth C. Lotterhos
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The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks has demonstrated rather painfully that security cannot be hardened or regulated to a point that eliminates all potential threats. To attempt a strategy solely on prevention would be prohibitively costly and is likely unsuccessful. Alternatively, implementing a containment regimen is far more manageable. Upon detection of potential cyber issues (through continuous penetration testing and forensic analysis), quickly isolating affected systems to limit damage and widespread or cascading impacts is paramount. Building in alternate system pathways and replicating or backing up essential information can harden a system against a crippling attack. Response plans must mitigate risk. This can be accomplished through active network monitoring (such as the Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program being pursued by the DOE and volunteering Bulk Power System entities), forensics, and the adoption of operating procedures and information sharing that are leading to future self-healing systems.
Energy leadership from the DOE, the Electric Sub-sector Coordinating Council (ESCC), the Government Coordinating Council (GCC), NERC, NAESB, NIST, and representatives from the telecommunications and Internet communities should determine and adopt a centralized governance and risk-coordination structure to guide and formulate a more recognizable strategic plan to ensure cyber security going forward versus the random, loosely coordinated and independent approach present today.
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