Publisher’s Note: This website is visited frequently by the press, Congressional staff and agency staff. CRE accepts comments from named individuals as well as anonymous comments in the comment section below.
In the last several days considerable attention is being given to use of a sleeper act, the Congressional Review Act (CRA), as a mechanism for correcting a perceived tilt in the regulatory state. Simultaneously there is increasing attention to limiting the Chevron deference by the enactment of proposed legislation (Separation of Powers Restoration Act).
Are these two efforts working in tandem, in opposition to each other or are they independent events? More specifically a federal agency could move to issue a rule significantly wider in scope than one eliminated by Congressional action under the CRA. From a Congressional standpoint what are the implications, if any, in removing the Chevron deference when Congress dutifully implements the Congressional Review Act particularly when the same party controls the House, Senate and White House?
A consensus on issues related to existing and proposed statutes is helpful in developing a policy position on the merits of easing judicial intervention in a venue currently dominated by participants from one party. Analysts are coping with an undefined benefit from increased judicial oversight when the House, Senate and White House are under the control of the same party.
A related question is whether a request for the judicial review of agency denials of Requests for Correction made pursuant to the Data Quality Act should be subject to a Chevron deference and whether the denial of such Requests for Correction should be subject to review under the Congressional Review Act?
N. B. Revocation of Chevron is not necessarily a panacea because it can be argued that the Sue and Settle controversy which allows federal agencies to bypass established rulemaking processes occurs in part because of an overreach of the judiciary.
